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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Granted Brown's Suppression Motion On The 
Erroneous Legal Theory That Briefly Requesting Consent To Search A Legally Detained 
Vehicle Constitutes An Unlawful Extension Of A Traffic Stop 
A. Introduction 
Late in the evening, after observing him suspiciously idle in an empty parking lot 
long after the local stores had closed, Officer Cwik pulled over Brown for driving a 
vehicle with a piece of opaque plastic taped across the back window obstructing his 
view. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, L.8 - p.6, L.20.) Officer Cwik told Brown about the violation 
and took his license, registration, and insurance, which he used to check for warrants 
and the status of Brown's license through dispatch. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-24.) 
After running the records check, Officer Cwik returned and, before returning Brown's 
license, registration, and proof of insurance, spent "about 30 seconds" discussing with 
Brown his driving pattern and requesting consent to search his vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., 
p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.5; p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.4; p.9, Ls.8-21; see also 4/30/2012 Tr., p.11, 
Ls.11-18; p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.18.) Brown granted consent and officers proceeded to 
search his vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.17-21.) 
Officers found large quantities of marijuana and other items indicative of drug 
delivery in Brown's vehicle. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.17, L.19) Brown moved the 
district court for an order suppressing the evidence. (R., pp.38-39.) The district court 
found that there was "no reason to believe that Mr. Brown's consent was coerced or 
threatened out of him." (5/24/2012 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-5.) However, because Officer Cwik 
requested consent to search before returning Brown's license, registration, and proof of 
insurance, the district court found that Brown's detention was extended and that the 
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extension was unlawful. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.10, L.6 - p.11, L.22.) Application of the 
correct legal standards, however, shows that the district court erred in its legal 
determination that Officer Cwik unlawfully extended Brown's detention. 
8. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review on a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the 
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 
160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
C. An Officer Does Not Offend The Fourth Amendment By Momentarily Extending A 
Traffic Stop To Request Consent To Search A Vehicle 
After a hearing on Brown's suppression motion, the district court made the legal 
conclusion that detaining Brown was reasonable. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) 
The district court found that, after running Brown's license and registration, the officer 
spoke with Brown for "about 30 seconds" during which time the officer requested and 
received consent to search Brown's vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.8, L. 23-p.9, L.16.) The 
district court further found that Officer Cwik extended the traffic stop "for no articulable 
reason other than for the officer to ask for consent to search the vehicle." (5/24/2012 
Tr., p.10, Ls.7-18.) The district court held that extending the traffic stop for "about 30 
seconds" to request consent to search Brown's vehicle was unlawful and so granted 
Brown's suppression motion. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.11, L.15 - p.12, L.1.) 
The district court's ruling directly contradicts the Court of Appeals' opinion in 
State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 11 P.3d 44 (Ct. App. 2000), which held that an officer 
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conducting a legal traffic stop may lawfully request consent to search the vehicle while 
the driver is still detained, when such a request only momentarily extends the traffic 
stop. ~ at 852-53, 11 P.3d at 48-49. It is well settled that, while a significant delay is 
unreasonable, officers maintain limited discretion to conduct brief inquiries unrelated to 
the purpose of a traffic stop. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 
(Ct. App. 2000). Momentarily requesting consent to search a vehicle during a 
conversation which lasts only "about 30 seconds" is therefore lawful and the district 
court erred in granting Brown's suppression motion on that basis. 
On appeal, Brown attempts to distinguish Silva. (Respondent's brief, pp.10-12.) 
His attempts are unavailing. In Silva, an officer observed Silva committing a traffic 
infraction, in that case speeding, and enforced a traffic stop. Silva, 134 Idaho at 851, 11 
P.3d at 47. After asking whether Silva had any drugs or weapons in his truck, the 
officer took Silva's license, registration, and proof of insurance, which he used to 
complete a records check while he wrote out a citation. ~ The officer then returned 
and spent about fifteen seconds explaining the citation to Silva, after which, while still 
holding the citation in his hand, he asked for consent to search Silva's vehicle. 1st 
Similarly in this case, Officer Cwik pulled over Brown after observing Brown commit a 
traffic infraction. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-21; p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) Officer Cwik took 
Brown's information to check Brown's driving status. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.8, 
L.3.) Officer Cwik then returned and, without returning Brown's documents, conversed 
with him for "about 30 seconds," during which time he requested permission to search 
Brown's vehicle and Brown consented. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-21.) 
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The only distinguishing feature between this case and Silva is that in Silva the 
Court correctly held that momentarily extending a traffic stop to request consent to 
search a vehicle is lawful, whereas the district court in this case held that it was not. On 
the basis of that erroneous legal conclusion, the district court's order suppressing the 
evidence should be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
Brown also appears to challenge the district court's factual finding that Officer 
Cwik spoke to Brown for "about 30 seconds," during which time he requested and 
obtained consent to search Brown's vehicle, before Brown exited his vehicle. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.10-12, nn.4-5.) In evaluating rulings on suppression motions, 
the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009). "Findings 
of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence." State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 127-28, 233 P.3d 52, 58-59 (2010). The 
district court found that Officer Cwik and Brown had a conversation that lasted "about 30 
seconds" before Brown exited the vehicle. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-12.) After Brown 
granted consent and exited the vehicle, officers began searching the vehicle. 
(5/24/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-21.) These factual findings are supported by both Officer 
Cwik's testimony and Defense Exhibit A. 
Regardless, the relevant inquiry in this case is whether a momentary extension of 
a traffic stop for the purpose of requesting and obtaining consent to search a vehicle is 
lawful. The district court erroneously concluded that it was not, and on that basis the 
district court should be reversed and this case remanded. 
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As an alternative basis for reversing the district court's erroneous order, the state 
argued in its Appellant's brief that, if the traffic stop was extended, any extension was 
supported by reasonable suspicion. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9.) In his Respondent's 
brief, Brown asserts that Officer Cwik lacked reasonable suspicion to justify expanding 
the scope of his investigation to drug crimes, arguing that an anonymous tip received by 
police was not sufficient to justify that investigation. (Respondent's brief, pp.12-14.) 
The state has already conceded that the anonymous tip, standing alone, would not be 
enough to justify the stop. (See Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) In this case, however, the 
anonymous tip was not standing alone. 
In addition to the anonymous tip, Officer Cwik had his own personal observations 
of Brown's suspicious conduct. Brown was suspiciously idling in a nearly abandoned 
parking lot in front of a closed Hastings bookstore in the late evening in an area where 
no businesses were open. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-18; p.12, Ls.7-12; 5/24/2012 Tr., 
p.5, Ls.8-21.) Brown's van matched the tipster's description of the vehicle where drugs 
were being sold. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.11, L.19- p.12, L.6.) Brown exited the parking lot, 
circling the block in an "eccentric or erratic" manner. (4/30/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.3-10; 
5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.6, L.12.) After detaining him for the traffic violation, Officer 
Cwik asked Brown about his driving pattern, but Brown, according to the district court, 
failed to offer "a very satisfying explanation" for his circuitous route. (4/30/2012 Tr., 
p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.21; 5/24/2012 Tr., p.6, L.25- p.7, L.5.) 
Whether an officer has the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is 
determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, not any one circumstance 
standing by itself. State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 
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2004). Although a series of facts may appear innocent when viewed separately, they 
may warrant further investigation when viewed together. State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 
913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2002). Under the totality of the circumstances of 
this case, where police had received an anonymous tip about drugs being sold out of a 
blue minivan in the neighborhood, where Brown was suspiciously idling in an 
abandoned parking lot long after the stores had closed in a blue minivan which matched 
the tipster's description, where police observed Brown driving in an irregular pattern 
around the block, and where Brown could not give a satisfactory answer for his traffic 
pattern, Officer Cwik had reasonable suspicion to further investigate a possible crime by 
taking "about 30 seconds" to request consent to search Brown's vehicle. 
Finally, Brown asserts that his detention itself was unlawful, apparently because 
no one referenced Idaho Code § 49-943 and, after officers found large quantities of 
marijuana in his minivan, Brown was not ultimately cited for the traffic violation. 
(Respondent's brief, pp.14-15.) Brown cites no authority for the proposition that officers 
are required to cite the specific code section violated or issue a citation for every traffic 
violation they observe. Rather, whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a 
suspect is an objective test not dependant on the subjective beliefs of an individual 
officer. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (2009) (citing Deen v. 
State, 131 Idaho 435,436, 958 P.2d 592,593 (1998)). 
Brown was operating a vehicle which had a piece of opaque plastic taped across 
the back window, necessarily obscuring Brown's view behind him. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.5, 
Ls.14-21; p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) That is an objective violation of Idaho Code§ 49-943. 
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Therefore, as correctly concluded by the district court, as a matter of law, Officer Cwik 
objectively had reasonable suspicion to stop Brown for his traffic violation. 
In this case, the district court held that momentarily extending a traffic stop to 
request and obtain consent to search a vehicle was unlawful. (5/24/2012 Tr., p.10, L.4 
- p.11, L.22.) As a matter of law, the district court's ruling was erroneous. The court's 
order suppressing evidence found during the consent-based search of Brown's vehicle 
should therefore be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of August, 2013. 
LJ.SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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